The Supreme Court as a Protector of Liberty Under the Rule of Law by Clark, Tom C.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 43
Issue 1 Summer 1959 Article 3
The Supreme Court as a Protector of Liberty
Under the Rule of Law
Tom C. Clark
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Tom C. Clark, The Supreme Court as a Protector of Liberty Under the Rule of Law, 43 Marq. L. Rev. 11 (1959).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol43/iss1/3
THE SUPREME COURT AS A PROTECTOR
OF LIBERTY UNDER THE RULE OF LAW
Tom C. CLARY*
At the outset, let me extend my congratulations to Marquette on the
golden anniversary of its law school. Like Pere Marquette, of whom
your school is the namesake, the law school has traveled far, until
now it stands in the front rank of our educational institutions.
It is fitting that you are commemorating your first half-century
with a program entitled "The Rule of Law-Bulwark of Ordered
Liberty." To pinpoint the free world's concept of ordered liberty you
have inaugurated during this fiftieth year a trilogy-not of dramas-
but of meetings dedicated to the holding of high converse concerning
what we are and what we ought to be in this respect. In the triumvirate
of your speakers I am the last. At least that is one thing for which
you can be thankful.
The President of the American Bar Association, The Honorable
Ross Malone, introduced the series with an eloquent and instructive
address on "The American Lawyer's Role in Promoting the Rule of
Law." As he so ably pointed out, "it was American lawyers who con-
ceived the rule of law as it is embodied in our Constitution and Bill
of Rights." I join with him in the belief that this and future genera-
tions may not only perpetuate but enlarge and extend it. The next
meeting was devoted to the subject "The Rule of Law in the World."
You were honored by the presence of Sir Leslie Munro, who brought
to you a brilliant address on the rights and responsibilities of nations
in the extension of the rule of law throughout the world. Sir Leslie
left with you the admonition that the challenge of our age is the ex-
tension of the rule of law throughout the world-the stakes, he right-
fully said, are survivial itself. The usurpation of a state by violence
or subversion-which we read about most every day-weakens the
rule of law throughout the world. He concluded that we of the free
world cannot afford such a diminution. The lesson that his address
teaches so well is that only through the rule of law can we hope
to have lasting peace amongst all peoples.
My task tonight is to elaborate upon the subject assigned to me,
"The Role of the Supreme Court as a Protector of Liberty under the
Rule of Law." I would be less than frank if I did not admit that the
scope of this assignment rather staggered me, for I would have to be
more than human to be able to compress the Court's span of 170 years
of decision-making in that field into less than a quarter of that many
* Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court since October 1949;
Attorney General of the United States 1945 to 1949.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
minutes. Those familiar will agree with Rufus Choate that "One
cannot drop the Greek alphabet to the ground and pick up the Iliad."
It requires much study--"midnight oil" we used to call it. So let us get
to the task.
Before a watchmaker's apprentice is introduced to the individual
movements of a watch, he is required to become familiar with that in-
strument as a completely integrated piece of machinery. By the same
token, one cannot launch into a detailed study of the role our High
Court plays in a specified area, without an appreciation of the over-all
function of the Court in our system of government.
Unlike the highest court of most other lands, ours came into being
along with the general government itself and was created by the same
hand. "We the people of the United States" created the three equal
and independent branches of our government and declared each to be
essential to the establishment of justice and to the enjoyment of the
blessings of liberty. In the Supreme Court and the "inferior courts"
created by the Congress, they vested the judicial power of the United
States, giving the judges thereof life tenure and undiminished com-
pensation.'
At first, it was not entirely clear from these simple words just what
the "judicial power of the United States" encompassed. Any doubt
on this score was soon dispelled, however, by the Court itself. Under
the vigorous and foresighted leadership of the great John Marshall,
who was Chief Justice from 1801 to 1835, the Court issued a number
of opinions which clarified and solidified its position, as well as that of
the federal government generally, 2 in our complex system of federal-
ism. Without doubt, the most important of these decisions was the
famous case of Marbury v. Madison,3 issued in 1803. Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in that case made clear that an important element
of the "judicial power" was the Court's power to act as a final inter-
preter of the Constitution and, just as importantly, to declare invalid
and unenforceable any Act of Congress inconsistent therewith. In his
own words, "No legislative act . . . contrary to the Constitution can
be valid."
In establishing this most powerful weapon, and extending it to
include the power of judicial review over the actions of the President
and decisions of the highest state courts,4 Marshall's Court but gave
effect to the declaration of Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No.
78, almost a score of years before, that every act of a "delegated au-
1 U.S. CONST., art. III.
2 See, e.g., M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819); Gibbons v. Ogden,
9 Wheat. 1 (1824).3 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
4Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816) (opinion by Mr. Justice
Story).
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thority" which is contrary to the Constitution is void. Likewise, it but
followed the course of state courts which had long exercised what
Luther Martin called "a negative on the laws."5 As Martin reported to
the Maryland legislature: "Whether therefore, any laws or regulations
of the congress, or any acts of its president or other officers are
contrary to, or not warranted by, the constitution, rests only with the
judges ... to determine; by whose determinations every state must be
bound."6
The role of the Court as the Supreme arbiter of .the government,
as thus set forth in the Constitution and clarified under Marshall, is
of fundamental importance, and has remained substantially unchanged
'down to the present day. Still the Founders, in establishing a govern-
ment of checks and balances, made the Court dependent on the other
branches of government. The President nominates the Justices; the
Senate possesses the power of confirmation. The Supreme Court has
but one irrevocable source of jurisdiction-original-and that has to
do only with controversies where a State is a party and those cases
affecting ambassadors, public ministers and consuls. In all other cases
its jurisdiction depends entirely upon "such Regulataions as the Con-
gress shall make."17 Moreover, the Court has no army to enforce its
decrees. All of us have heard of the apocryphal comment attributed
to President Jackson following the decision of the Court in Worcester
v. Georgia,8 in 1832: "Well, John Marshall has made his decision, now
let him enforce it." Furthermore, the Court has no treasury from
which to draw financial support. The Congress provides, at the
moment less than two million dollars per year.
Nevertheless, any combination of five of its members-so long as
Congress leaves its composition at nine-wields sufficient power to
overturn the action of either or both of the coordinate branches, if
that action is presented in a case of controversy. You will note the if,
for the Court is not a "Council of Revision" exercising a veto power, 0
but is largely a passive instrument of judicial interpretation. It trans-
lates, as my late brother Jackson often said, "into current commands
and contemporary application" the provisions of our Constitution arid
the laws enacted thereunder.
Its function in our system can be analogized to that of the umpire
that you provide on the baseball field. This being the home town of the
Braves you will understand. And, having many sandlotters, you will
5 Speech at Constitutional Convention, July 21, 1787,Documnents -Formation
of the Union, Government Printing Office (1927).
6 "The Genuine Information," Secret Proceedings of the Federal Convention
53, Government Printing Office (1909) (italics in original).
7 U.S. CONST. art. III.
8 6 Pet. 515 (1832).
9 1 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 759.
20 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
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appreciate this story. Not long ago some visiting youngsters came to
the Court as sightseers. One asked, "Just why a Supreme Court?"
My brother Burton, whom they were interviewing, asked if they played
ball, and, receiving an affirmative answer, replied, "Do you have an
umpire ?" "Well," the leader responded, "we do if we want to play nine
innings. Otherwise we end up in a fight." And Brother Burton said
"that's why we have a Supreme Court." The umpire keeps law and
order in the ball park. He translates the pitched ball into a strike, a ball
or an out. He dodges pop bottles, too, as well as other missiles, verbal
and solid. He has rules in the playing of the game which guide him in
his decisions.
The Court, too, operates by rule. In addition to the restrictions laid
down in the Constitution and by the Congress, heretofore mentioned,
the Court has other, self-imposed limitations upon the exercise of its
power. The case or controversy presented must be a genuine dispute"
raising a substantial question.1 2 The Court does not deal in advisory
opinions, moot questions, nor political issues. 13 Traditionally it shies
away from deciding constitutional questions; not rendering such a
decision unless it is absolutely necessary to the disposition of the case. 14
And even though a substantial constitutional issue is presented it will
not be passed upon if the case can be disposed of on a non-constitu-
tional ground.' 5 An appeal from the highest state court is dismissed if
that court's judgment can be sustained on an independent state
ground.' 6 A statute is not construed unless the complaining party
shows that he is substantially injured by its enforcement.' 7 An attack
on an Act of Congress on constitutional grounds is by-passed in the
event a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the con-
stitutional question may be avoided.' 8 And, finally, the certiorari sys-
tem, authorized by Congress thirty years ago, requires the affirmative
vote of four justices before a petition is granted. 9
Current statistics show an increasing volume of business coming to
the Court-now nearly two thousand cases each Term. Only a small
percentage of these cases are disposed of on the merits. Last Term it
was less than 15%. Despite this volume, the Court has during its
11 See supra note 10.12 See, e.g., Revised Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 19.
'3Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849); Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph
Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) ; Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
14 See Siler v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909) ; Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (concurring opinion).
15 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
46 Klinger v. Missouri, 13 Wall. 257, 263 (1872) ; Enterprise Irrigation District
v. Farmers Mutual Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157 (1917).
'7 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
is See supra notes 14 and 15. See also United States v. Auto Workers, 352 U.S.
567, 589-592 (1957).
19 This is by custom, rather than by rule. See the discussion in Stern and
Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 145-146 (2d ed.).
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entire existence of 170 years decided just over 4,000 cases involving
questions of constitutional interpretation. The overwhelming percentage
of these involved federal statutes or action rather than those of a State.
For the most part, they stemmed from a handful of constitutional
provisions, including the commerce, the contract, and the necessary and
proper clauses, and the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to our Constitution.
Now that we have the picture of the Court as an operating piece
of machinery, we may turn more specifically to an examination of its
role as a "Protector of Liberty under the Rule of Law."
"Protector of Liberty under the Rule of Law !" These are magnifi-
cent words to describe a magnificent function. But what is "liberty?"
As is true of such words as "freedom," "democracy," and "justice,"
the word liberty is a mighty word, charged with emotion. However,
it is also an abstract one-having such meaning as one injects into
it. Thus, its significance tends to change from person to person and
from time to time. Perhaps this is what Mak Twain had in mind when
he said, "Solomon's justice depends on how Solomon was raised."
But liberty is a dynamic, not a static, concept. As an Anglo-Amer-
ican product, it has been developing, growing and expanding for nearly
seven-and-a-half centuries-since the year 1215, when the English
nobles first won a measure of liberty and equality by forcing King
John to sign the Magna Carta. At that time, of course, what liberty
there was existed solely for the nobles and titled gentry. But the
process did not stop there. It continued to develop from the struggles
of the Parliament with the Crown; and of the courts against both, until
it reached full bloom under the leadership of such great judges as
Lord Coke.
By July 4, 1776, the idea of liberty, and of those entitled to it, had
developed sufficiently that the thirteen United States of America
could issue a document which proudly declared that:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty,
and the pursuit of Happiness-that to secure these rights, Gov-
ernments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed. ...
Even then, the development did not cease. Our concept of liberty
has continued to grow, to expand, to reach out and gather in more and
more people within its protective shield. Thus, it was only after one of
the most terrible and bloody wars in the history of mankind that
slavery in our country was abolished, and men were able to vote, to
live, and otherwise to to partake of "liberty" "without regard to race,
color, or previous condition of servitude. ' 20 It was only after another
20 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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long and difficult struggle-this time in the courts, in the legislature,
and in the public meeting place-that a constitutional amendment was
passed in 1920 which for the first time gave women the right-the
liberty, if you will-to vote.21
Throughout this long history, which extends to the present day and,
God willing, will continue far into the future, there has been a thread
of consistency which has continually woven its way through the warp
and woof of life to fashion the fabric we call liberty. That thread
has been the two-fold principle that whenever the rights or liberties
of one man are threatened, so are the rights and liberties of all
men and the obverse of this-that whenever one man or group of men
is at "liberty" to wield power indiscriminately, it destroys pro tanto
the liberty of all those not possessing that power. It is the bipartite
nature of this principle which gives rise to the necessity of striking a
delicate balance between the rights of the individual and those of the
public. To establish such a balance means liberty-equal justice under
law.
This balancing process takes place all along the broad front of our
concepts of liberty. The freedoms of speech and press must be bal-
anced against the interests of all persons as expressed in the defama-
tion 22 and obscenity laws.2 3 The freedom of religion is not, in our so-
ciety, permitted to include the practices of polygamy 24 or human sacri-
fice. In the field of economics, it is an American tradition that one has
a right to accumulate all the wealth that his initiative and enterprise
can earn. But over the years, the power abuses made possible by such
wealth have been tempered more and more by laws protecting those
who, individually, lack that power: laws to protect the working people,
in the form of laws regulating working hours and minimum wages, as
well as laws protecting the right to bargain collectively; laws to protect
the buying public in food, drugs and other necessities; laws to protect
free enterprise itself, in the form of anti-trust and unfair competition
statutes.
But it is the field of the criminal law that the balancing process
is most strikingly presented. One of the most important functions of
government is to afford the citizen protection against those who would
murder, maim or rob him. Without this protection, no person can truly
be said to possess liberty. In the formation of our Government, how-
ever, the Founding Fathers-having been made fully aware of the pos-
sibility that those in possession of governmental power might misuse
it-insisted upon a counterbalance; a Bill of Rights to ensure that no
person accused of crime would be deprived of his individual liberty
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
22 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
23 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
24 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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without extensive procedural and substantive safeguards against power
abuse. As Mr. Justice Cardozo so well said:
The law . . . is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant
charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the es-
sence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as
to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be ac-
ceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate
and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of in-
criminating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due
to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained
till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance
true.25
Both sides of each of the equations in all these fields represent in-
terests included within our modern-day concepts of liberty. This bundle
of rights has not been acquired over-night, and no one stick in the
bundle has been earned without a struggle. But I submit to you, my
friends, that the result has been well worth the price.
What, then, of the role of t!he Supreme Court in this endless weigh-
ing and balancing process-its role as "a protector of liberty." The
answer is provided largely by a reference back to the function the
Court performs generally in our federal system. Essentially, the Court's
role is carried out by the interposition of judicial authority between
political or economic force and those whose liberty it might destroy.
On one side of the equation, this means simply that the Court, together
with the lower courts, provides a ready forum for the remedy of a
private or public wrong. On the other side, it means that procedural
sefeguards are imposed and scrupulously observed to ensure that the
forum-be it civil or criminal-is not misused.
Let me say, however, that while the Court has the power so to
interpose this judicial authority-a power conspicuously absent from
courts under dictatorships-the exercise of that power is nevertheless
limited by jurisdictional, procedural and political handicaps. Some of
these obstacles I have already indicated. Another is delay in adjudica-
tion. The Court must wait until some litigant presents a case. It has
no built-in self-starter. Often it takes a half-decade before a suit
completes its tortuous course to us. The damage is often done long be-
fore the judicial remedy for the breach is effective. Then, too, many
of the actions of government involve the exercise of excutive or
legislative powers the supervision over which the Court has renounced,
such as governmental action raising political questions or those involv-
ing foreign affairs. Likewise the war power, necessarily exercised
with a firm and independent hand, steps on the toes of many. The
provocation for action in the name of the necessities of war has been
brought home to my generation twice, and still has not entirely abated.
25 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).
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In this area especially, the Court often has to defer judgment in favor
of the conclusions of the other branches of the government, even
though some persons might be hurt as a result. 2G
In this regard, you will note that we have spoken only of the
Court's role as "a" protector of liberty, not as "the" protector. As Mr.
Justice Holmes once said, "It must be remembered that legislators
are the ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people
in quite as great a degree as the courts."27 The same is of course true
of the executive, for as Chief Justice Stone also pointed out, "Courts
are not the only agency of government that must be assumed to have
capacity to govern."28 Indeed, the three branches of our government-
though occasionally at odds-work together with remarkable unanimity.
The existence of this shared burden illustrates the final and most
fundamental limitation on the Court's power to interpose judicial
authority between the assertion of conflicting rights. The Court in-
variably works from general rules which have already been established
in the documents of government. The supreme repository is of course
the Constitution itself; others are found in statutes and executive
orders. The Court's powers are thus called into play only after a trial
balance has already been struck. It would be a gross and indeed inac-
curate understatement, however, to say that judges do not make law,
but only apply it. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said, "The question
is not whether judges may legislate, but rather when and how much."
The proscription that "No State shall ...deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law,"2 9 sets out the general
rules of fair play. Along with many other provisions in the Constitu-
tion as well as in innumerable statutes, it only goes so far into the bal-
ancing process as to provide the scales and mark off the divisions in
hundredweights. It is the Court which is called upon to make the
finer and more delicate adjustments in pounds, ounces and grams. As
Holmes put it, "I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must
legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from
molar to molecular motions." 30
These limits on the creative aspect of the Court's role do not make
of it a static body. Quite to the contrary, it not only can but it also must
-as part of a government "of the people, by the people, and for the
people"-approach its task in the spirit of the times and be truly re-
flective of that spirit. As a "protector of liberty," it must be as dynamic
as the concept it is protecting; and, as protective as the ever growing
and expanding ideal of liberty requires, as it extends to more and
26 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
27 Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1903).
28 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87 (1936) (dissenting opinion).
29 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
30 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (dissenting opinion).
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more people in ever-increasing fields; it must be as ready and willing
to accept and protect that concept as any branch of government.
Particularly is this true in the field of constitutional law. At the
very beginning of the Court's history, the great Chief Justice Marshall
issued two famous dicta which have ever since served to guide the
Court in its duties. He admonished that "[W] e must never forget that
it is a constitution we are expounding." 31 and, furthermore, that the
Constitution was "intended to endure for ages to come, and, conse-
quently, to be adapted to the various crisis of human affairs.
3 2
It has not always been easy for the Court to carry out its assigned
function. Its task by definition is performed amidst strife. Its powers
are called into play only when there are opposing litigants, each of
which invariably believes firmly in the righteousness of his cause. This
task is not made any the easier by the knowledge that the opposing
sides of every litigation represent conflicting doctrines. In every such
battle there must by the very nature of things be a winner and a loser
-and this applies to the opposing doctrines as well as the opposing
litigants.
Whether the Court has lived up to its job is a matter for history.
That it has diligently worked at it there is no denying. Certainly it is
true that, for better or for worse, it cannot falter as it performs its
umpire-like role. The stakes-liberty for all men-are too high for that
to happen. It was Attorney General Wickersham who, on the occasion
of the death of Chief Justice Fuller, remarked: "Much of the work of
all courts is of but transitory importance except in so far as it keeps
ever burning the sacred lamp of justice to lighten the footsteps of
men."
So long as the Court sits, let us hope this sacred lamp continues
to burn brightly so that every man may not only read the words in-
scribed over the Court's facade but truly have and enjoy "Equal Jus-
tice under Law."
a' M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in the original).
32 Id., at 415 (emphasis in original).
1959]
